CRS/SARO - El Niño Response Coordinator: Lesotho Food Security and Response; Capacity Assessment, Field Validation Visit Report, March 18th through March 26, 1998
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
"Lesotho was reported to be among the countries worst affected by El Nino 97/98. Crop forecasts are about 30% the already low 96/97 season. Lesotho Government sources report severe food shortages in vulnerable districts. Some international organizations and NGO's argue in favor of emergency food relief interventions. The CRS/SARO visit was to assess these food crisis reports and to evaluate partners capacity to respond to such an emergency and to engage in mitigation activities to increase preparedness for future crises.
During this assessment and validation mission we were able to observe directly the crop and livestock conditions in the main production areas in the Highlands, Foothills and Lowlands districts. We also interviewed Lesotho Government officials in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Disaster Management Authority, official representatives of the major international agencies (WFP, FAO, UNICEF, FEWS, USEMB) concerned with the situation, as well as officers of the most active local and international NGO's. The following is a summary of our findings:
1. We found no evidence of significant food shortages which may require emergency short term relief intervention. The reports indicating severe shortages in some areas could not be verified on site. There is a shortage of hard field data on the crop and household food situation. Reports suggesting severe food access difficulties and signs of emerging famine are not based on direct surveys or close observation. We did not detect the activation of the early coping mechanisms that would announce the start of a food crisis situation.
2. Despite the lack of reliable information some international agencies have made available food for emergency distribution. Euronaid has committed 15,000 mt and some NGO's (possibly including CARITAS) may participate in the operation. Insufficient field information will make it difficult to target distribution to the most affected areas and sectors.
3. Although a combination of harmful weather patterns did harm cereal crops in Lesotho, the country's chronic food shortages can not be attributed to climatic anomalies. During the past decade Lesotho has had to import about 50% of its cereal consumption needs. Current estimates for the 98/99 marketing season suggest import requirements of about 300,000 mt of cereals or about 58% of its consumption needs.
4. Normally Lesotho pays for its food imports through open market mechanisms. The principal millers who import grain from South Africa report normal demand patterns in this pre harvest lean period. Other indicators support the view that there is sufficient and possibly expanding purchasing power in all but a few very specific social sectors to pay for food requirements.
5. Expansion and diversification of income sources improves food security situation. Independent studies of the evolution of household income in Lesotho identify important changes in the past decade that reduce food access problems for large sectors of the population, and reduce the need for governmental and/or international food relief interventions. A more detailed description of the changes taking place in purchasing power is included in the body of this report.
6. Lesotho's food problems are not caused by drought or lack of water. Water is the country's most important and abundant natural resource. It is misleading to describe the country's agriculture as vulnerable to drought or shortage of rainfall.
7. International and national agricultural experts point to 3 factors to explain the low food production in the country: 1) Topography, soil and climate do not favor the cultivation of maize which is now grown in as much as 70% of the arable land; 2) The almost total absence of water harvesting, management and irrigation system makes all agriculture dependent on erratic rainfall; and 3) Monocropping, inadequate seed and generally inappropriate cultivation techniques decrease yields and increase farmers risks discouraging planting.
8. There is notable agreement among experts on the types of changes to be promoted in Lesotho to increase food self sufficiency, these are: 1) Reduce drastically the proportion of land used in maize single cropping and shift planting to horticulture, fruit trees, and high value short cycle crops; 2) Increase livestock value and income by improving breeds, more appropriate grass varieties, and feed storage facilities for the winter season; and 3) Launch a large scale water management based soil preservation and rehabilitation program to sustain irrigation schemes for horticulture.
9. The Lesotho Government institutions (Ministry of Agriculture Extension Services and the Disaster Management Authority networks) that would be required to play a leading role in a food emergency operation, or in an agricultural transformation strategy as outlined lack the appropriately trained staff, the infrastructure and the links to the farming communities required. No meaningful strategy to increase food production could succeed in Lesotho without the commitment of significant resources to the strengthening of these institutional networks.
10. The local and international NGO's operating in Lesotho could execute an emergency food distribution operation in the event of a major natural or man made disruption. With the apparent growth in purchasing power in the urban centers the need for a major intervention of this kind is unlikely. NGO's could also play a supporting role in the implementation of a strategy of transformation of the agricultural practices in the country but their effectiveness is limited by their lack of coordination and their individual agendas.
11. CRS partners in the CARITAS network, within the 450 primary and secondary schools of the Catholic Church, and through its health and services missions are the strongest NGO structure in the country. Unfortunately its enormous potential to be part of the changes required is severely hindered by a lack of developmental focus and a shortage of well trained technical staff and teachers to lead this process. Church leadership is aware of these needs and is looking for international assistance from Catholic donors to undertake this internal transformation. Report prepared by Gino Lofredo, El Niño Response Coordinator, Catholic Relief Services, Southern Africa Regional Office <lofredo@icon.co.zw>.
Apparent and probable causes of the decline in food production in Lesotho:
The average annual cereal production in Lesotho has dropped from 215,282 mt in the 1970's, to 160,736 mt in the 1980's to 157,907 mt in the 1990's. The average annual cereal requirements instead have increased from 260,017 mt in the 1970's to about 400,000 mt in the 1990's. The average annual shortfall as % of requirements has increased from 17% in the 1970's to 50% in the 1980's to 61% in the 1990's. This decline can not be attributed to the erratic weather patterns which have been a constant presence in Lesotho.
Many sources continue to attribute the fall in agricultural production in the 97/98 season to the effects of the El Nino weather pattern in Southern Africa. These assertions have no basis. First, it is now agreed that El Nino had little impact on the weather pattern in the region in the 97/98 season. Second, the weather anomalies that affected Lesotho since August 97 -- while apparently more severe than in other seasons --conform to a recurrent pattern of erratic rains, rapid temperature changes, and shifting seasonal calendars described by early missionary settlers in the mid 19th century and before by diverse Basutho accounts.
Several simplistic characterizations of the agricultural and livestock environment often cited as principal causes of the decline in food production need to be reconsidered:
Lesotho's food problems are not caused by drought or lack of water. Water is the country's most important and abundant natural resource. While regions of the country may face periods of insufficient rainfall, the country has literally incalculable natural sources of water available year around from natural springs, highland frost, and intense though unpredictable rains in most areas. Most of these water sources are not adequately measured. A team of hydrologists estimated it would take six years to fill the Katse Dam catchment area. It filled in two years. It is misleading to describe the country as vulnerable to drought. Excessive water in the absence of a meaningful water management strategy (excluding the Katse Dam complex) is a source of serious agricultural difficulties in the Foothills and Lowlands. Properly managed, the water available beyond that exported to South Africa could sustain four seasons crops in the agricultural areas.
The problem in Lesotho is not a lack of arable land but the inappropriate and wasteful use of existing prime agricultural land, particularly in the Lowlands. Lesotho's arable and grazing lands -- though seriously threatened by erosion and urban expansion -- could increase dramatically the food access of all sectors of the population. Agriculturalists and geographers point out that only about 10% of the country's total area is suitable for agriculture. They further note that this area is shrinking at an alarming rate due to erosion and unplanned expansion of urban areas. This figure of 10% underestimates the Highland areas suitable for wheat, sorghum and fresh vegetable cultivation (which in the current season are doing relatively well). But the most serious limitations to production are the inadequate agricultural practices. The vast majority of this land is planted with maize, which is most vulnerable to erratic rainfall, and from a comparative advantage one of the worst economic investments. A rapid survey in the lowlands shows seriously inappropriate agricultural practices: monocropping with maize, minimal use of improved seeds, very little horticulture and fruit trees, practically no water management and irrigation schemes, insufficient weeding and cultivation, little or no pest control, very limited crop rotation, a high percentage of fields not planted.
Population growth is not a sufficient explanation of the worsening food self sufficiency. First of all, latest census figures show that the Lesotho population is growing at a much slower rate than projected a few years ago: latest count shows 12% less people than expected and nobody knows what happened to them. Second, the diversification of employment and the subsequent increase in purchasing power expands the market for agricultural products and -- when accompanied by shifts in crops and drastic improvements in cultivation techniques -- becomes the most important incentive to increased agriculture and livestock production. It is true that Lesotho could not supply the maize consumption requirements of its population even under improved growing conditions. But it could produce a broad range of other mostly non cereal products, fruits and vegetables for the local and South African markets and expand the importation of the staple cereal requirements.
Evidence suggest that despite declines in production Lesotho does not need to depend on external food aid to meet its consumption requirements. This contrary view is shared tacitly if not explicitly by some international agencies and NGO's, and, most unfortunately, by some Lesotho Government officials at the national and district level within the Disaster Management Authority and in some departments of the Ministry of Agriculture. No one denies that food aid provided through any of the many schemes available might be justified for some extreme cases of natural or man made catastrophes in Lesotho. However: 1) The Lesotho Government is expected to have incomes to maintain a sufficient grain reserve to respond to such emergencies without external intervention; 2) Lesotho is not immune to all the cultural, economic and political problems that become the unintended consequences of humanitarian food relief operations such as: * reinforcement of passive and dependent cultural attitudes among people and public and private institutions; * reduction of incentives to improve production and do mitigation activities to prepare for recurrent crop problems; * distortions in the food supply marketing mechanisms; * pernicious opportunities for the use of food assistance for political objectives; * proliferation of opportunities for misappropriation of resources for private benefit. And 3) External food assistance interventions take the pressure off the government and the population to address decisively those causes of food access difficulties which could be corrected by changes in agricultural practices, livestock breeding and environmental preservation."--Gino Lofredo, CRS/SARO, e-mail lofredo@icon.co.zw, phone 2634 - 792072, or Mark Jones, CRS/Madagascar, e-mail curs@bow.dts.mg, phone 2612 - 226534.